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The First Amendment proscribes Congress from enacting laws 
that restrict the content of speech.1 Despite the unequivocal language 
of the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has 
consistently held that it does not protect obscenity.2 The Court has 
offered two primary reasons for not protecting obscenity: 1) obscenity 
contributes nothing to society; and 2) obscenity was simply never 
intended to be protected.3 
In contrast to obscene speech, violent speech gets full First 
Amendment protection.4 While the Court states that obscenity 
categorically contributes nothing to society, it reasons that even the 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2001, University of Minnesota. Michael dedicates this Note to his 
nieces and nephews: Madison, Tyler, Gabriel, Brenner, Eva, and his next nephew 
due in June 2007. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2. 
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973). 
3 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 483-84. 
4 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 449 (1969). 
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most despicable, hateful, violent speech benefits society in some way, 
and is thus deserving of constitutional protection.5 
In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois ruled that two Illinois statutes aimed at restricting the sale of 
violent and sexually explicit video games to minors violated the First 
Amendment.6 The court determined that both the Illinois Violent 
Video Games Law (“VVGL”) and Illinois Sexually Explicit Video 
Games Law (“SEVGL”) were content-based restrictions that could be 
justified only by compelling interests and narrowly tailored plans.7 
The State appealed the SEVGL ruling only, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that 
the SEVGL required and did not pass strict scrutiny.8 
While both statutes failed strict scrutiny at trial, the VVGL and 
SEVGL failed for different reasons. The district court determined the 
VVGL did not encompass a compelling interest,9 whereas the SEVGL 
did encompass a compelling interest, but was not narrowly tailored.10 
The court recognized the importance of protecting minors from violent 
content, but held that it did not provide a constitutional basis to 
regulate speech.11 
While the VVGL got hung up in compelling interest analysis, the 
trial court simply assumed protecting children from sexual-themed 
content is compelling, and moved on to narrow tailoring analysis.12 
The Seventh Circuit applied the same cursory compelling interest 
analysis to the SEVGL.13 
                                                 
5 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
6 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich (ESA I), 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051,1055 
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). 
7 Id. at 1072, 1078. 
8 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich (ESA II), 469 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
9 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1073-76. 
10 Id. at 1080. 
11 Id. at 1073-76. 
12 Id. at 1080. 
13 ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646. 
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This Note will contend that while both the trial court and Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling were consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the 
disparate levels of protection afforded violent and sexually explicit 
speech are legally and logically inconsistent. This inconsistency 
presents different problems for adults and minors, and requires 
different remedies. For adults, obscenity should be afforded the same 
constitutional protection as violent content. And in the realm of 
minors, the notion of protecting children from harmful content should 
apply with as much rigor to violent content as it does to sexually 
explicit content. 
Section I will detail the relevant history of First Amendment 
protection of violent and sexually explicit materials. Section II will 
examine the district court and Seventh Circuit applications of the 
relevant First Amendment and obscenity tests in ESA I & ESA II, 
respectively. Section III will explore how the Seventh Circuit and 
Supreme Court should alter obscenity law for adults and content 
restrictions for minors. 
 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS VIOLENT SPEECH BUT DOES NOT 
PROTECT OBSCENITY 
 
A. Content-based Restrictions 
 
With limited exceptions, the First Amendment prevents the 
government from enacting laws that restrict expression because of its 
content.14 As a result, any restriction on the content of speech or 
expression is presumptively invalid.15  
Our political system and culture depend on the principle that 
citizens, rather than government, decide what messages are worth 
stating or receiving.16 Instead, citizens bear this responsibility 
individually, and any attempt by the government to restrict expression 
                                                 
14 E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
15 Id. 
16 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
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poses the risk that it is attempting to stifle unpopular ideas.17 Thus, 
courts apply the most stringent tool of analysis, strict scrutiny, to any 
content-based restriction.18 Strict scrutiny demands that content-based 
restrictions “must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
government interest.”19 
There are, however, several limited exceptions to the First 
Amendment’s ban on content-based restrictions.20 Namely, the First 
Amendment does not protect child pornography21 or libel.22 
And although obscenity was long assumed unprotected, it wasn’t 
until 1957 when the Supreme Court expressly ruled in Roth v. United 
States that the Constitution affords obscene content no protection.23 In 
Roth, the Court first explained that the “unconditional phrasing of the 
First Amendment” is not actually unconditional.24 It also explained 
that the purpose of the First Amendment is “to assure [the] unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”25  
Thus, the First Amendment protects all speech of social 
importance, regardless of its nature or content, because it furthers the 
constitutional purpose of promoting social and political discourse.26 
But the Court determined that any value obscenity might provide “is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”27 And 
because obscenity is not protected, the Court decided it didn’t need to 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 See id. at 642. 
19 U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
20 E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992). 
21 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002). 
22 Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). 
23 354 U.S. 476, 481, 485 (1957). 
24 Id. at 483. 
25 Id. at 484. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). 
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consider exactly how obscenity diminishes order or morality.28 This 
form of circular reasoning pervades obscenity law and is 
representative of the underlying problem with obscenity law.29 
Although the Court was certain that obscenity is per se excluded 
from First Amendment protection, it was not as certain of just how to 
define obscenity.30 It ultimately held that obscenity is not synonymous 
with sex, but rather “deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient 
interest.”31 This, of course, begs the question of what exactly 
“prurient” means. The Court cited several sources to define prurient 
and pruriency.32 These definitions include:  
 
• “material having a tendency to excite lustful 
thoughts;”33  
• “uneasy with desire or longing;”34  
• “lascivious desire or thought;”35  
• “[a] thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its 
predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a 
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or 
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond 
customary limits of candor in description or 
representation of such matters.”36 
 
                                                 
28 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 486-87. 
29 See, e.g., id. at 486-87 (arguing that it is irrelevant whether obscenity 
actually causes harm because it is not protected). 
30 Id. at 487-88. 
31 Id. at 487. 
32 Id. at 488 n.20. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 488 n.20 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(Unabridged, 2d ed. 1949)). 
35 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 n.20 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY (Unabridged, 2d ed. 1949)). 
36 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 n.20 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) 
(Tentative Draft No. 6 1957)). 
5
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The Court concluded its analysis of obscenity generally by stating 
that government intrusion on freedom of speech must only occur when 
necessary to protect more important interests.37 Obscenity, the Court 
decided, encroached on more important interests.38 While it does not 
explicitly state what those interests were, the opinion suggested the 
interests were “social order and morality.”39 But how obscenity 
diminishes social order and morality went unexplored by the Court. 
We’re essentially left to take the Court’s word for it. 
Interestingly, the Court conceded that states may regulate 
obscenity merely for the “lustful thoughts” it provokes, and not 
because it causes lawlessness, harm, or even “antisocial conduct.”40 
This stands in stark contrast to the Court’s stance on violent speech, 
which cannot be regulated merely for thoughts provoked or 
advocated.41 
 
B. Evolution of Obscenity Law 
 
1. Ginsberg v. New York 
 
In 1968, the Court decided the seminal case Ginsberg v. New 
York.42 Today, Ginsberg stands for the proposition that states may 
regulate sexual materials intended for minors that they would not be 
able to regulate for adults.43  
In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York 
statute regulating sales of sexually explicit magazines to minors.44 The 
                                                 
37 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488. 
38 See id. 
39 Id. at 485. 
40 Id. at 486. 
41 C.f., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (statutes regulating 
“mere advocacy” of violence “fall[] within the condemnation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments”). 
42 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
43 See id. at 637. 
44 Id. at 631, 633. 
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New York statute adapted the three-part test for determining obscenity 
from A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure” v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
in order to define obscenity “on the basis of its appeal to minors.”45  
By upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court also 
upheld the concept of “variable obscenity.”46 Variable obscenity is the 
notion that content that is merely indecent when intended for adults 
may be obscene when intended for children.47 
Notably, the Court premised its decision on the basis of potential 
harm sexually explicit materials may cause to minors.48 This 
represents a departure from Roth, which allowed obscenity restrictions 
solely for the “lustful thoughts” provoked.49 In Ginsberg, the Court 
held that states may regulate sales of sexually explicit materials to 
minors by finding a rational basis for the conclusion that the material 
is harmful to minors.50 While this does not require scientific certainty 
of harm,51 by premising the decision on potential harm rather than 
mere thoughts incited, Ginsberg required more of legislatures than 
Roth. 
 
 2. Miller v. California: The modern test for obscenity. 
 
While the Court held in Roth that obscenity is not protected 
speech,52 it did not set a clear test for determining what constitutes 
                                                 
45 Id. at 635. 
46 Id. at 636. 
47 Id. (“[T]he concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary 
according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom 
it is quarantined.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. 
Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75 (1966))). 
48 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640-41. 
49 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957). 
50 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641. 
51 Id. at 642-43. 
52 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. 
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obscenity until 1973 when it decided Miller v. California.53 In Miller, 
the Court articulated a three-part test for juries to apply to determine 
whether content is obscene:54  
 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards’ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, or scientific value.55 
 
This test, while very similar to the Memoirs formulation and the 
Ginsberg test, differs in one principal way.56 The final prong of the 
Miller test requires triers of fact consider “whether the work, taken as 
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, or scientific value,” while the 
Memoirs test used the term “utterly without redeeming social 
importance.”57 
Miller’s primary legacy is its test for obscenity, but the Court also 
took great pains in the opinion to affirm Roth.58 It stated that 
categorizing obscenity as a part of the “free and robust exchange of 
ideas and political debate” demeans the First Amendment and all that 
it represents.59 It further stated that First Amendment protection was 
designed to allow the exchange of ideas to stimulate political and 
                                                 
53 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574 (2002) (“Ending over a decade of 
turmoil, this Court in Miller set forth the governing three-part test for assessing 
whether material is obscene and thus unprotected by the First Amendment”); see 
also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
54 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
55 Id. 
56 See ESA II, 469 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2006). 
57 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25. 
58 See id. at 34-35. 
59 Id. at 34. 
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social change.60 But rather than recognize the potential role obscenity 
could play in bringing about change in society’s attitudes toward sex, 
the Court decided that obscenity cannot contribute to this exchange or 
stimulate social change.61 
Furthermore, Miller also represents a step backward from 
Ginsberg because the Court spoke in Ginsberg to the harms sexually 
explicit materials may cause minors as a basis for regulation, but the 
Court abandoned this line of reasoning in Miller. Rather, the Court 
reverted back to the Roth line of reasoning that obscenity may be 
regulated simply because it is offensive.62 
 
C. Violent speech receives full First Amendment protection. 
 
In contrast to obscene speech, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Constitution affords the full protection of the First Amendment to 
violent expression.63 This means that states may only regulate violent 
speech where it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action” and “is likely to incite or produce such action.”64 This test 
immunizes advocacy of violence from government control.65 For 
government regulation to succeed, the expression must do more than 
merely “increase[] the chance an unlawful act will be committed at 
some indefinite time in the future.”66 In this way, the test distinguishes 
between mere advocacy of violence and words designed to incite 
imminent lawless action.67 
This test, of course, differs significantly from the Miller test for 
obscenity, which only requires a showing that content appeals to 
                                                 
60 Id. at 34-35 (citing Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
61 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 35. 
62 See id. 
63 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 448. 
66 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
67 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49. 
9
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prurient interests.68 Obscenity need not actually have any causal 
relationship with harm,69 but violence, on the other hand, must be 
shown that it is both designed to cause and likely to cause imminent 
harm.70 
 
II. APPLICATION OF THE BRANDENBURG TEST FOR VIOLENT SPEECH AND 
THE GINSBERG/MILLER TEST FOR OBSCENITY IN ESA I & II 
 
A. ESA I 
 
The Seventh Circuit recently had the rare opportunity to apply 
both the Brandenburg test for violent content and the Ginsberg/Miller 
paradigm for sexually explicit content when it affirmed a case from 
the Northern District of Illinois.71 
ESA I involved a challenge to two statutes restricting the sale of 
certain video games to minors.72 Groups representing developers, 
distributors, and retailers of video games challenged the 
constitutionality of the Illinois Violent Video Game Law (“VVGL”) 
and the Sexually Explicit Video Game Law (“SEVGL”).73 
 
1. VVGL did not include any compelling interests. 
 
All parties in ESA I agreed the VVGL was a content-based 
restriction subject to strict scrutiny analysis.74 But the state claimed it 
had five compelling interests in regulating violent video games for 
minors:  
 
                                                 
68 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
69 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642 (1968). 
70 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
71 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005) aff’d, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
72 Id. at 1055-56. 
73 Id. at 1055. 
74 Id. at 1072. 
10
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1) preventing violent, aggressive, and asocial 
behavior; 
2) preventing psychological harm to minors who play 
such games; 
3) eliminating societal factors that may inhibit the 
physiological and neurological development of its 
youth; 
4) facilitating the maturation of Illinois’ children into 
law-abiding, productive adults; and, 
5) assisting parents in protecting their children from 
such games.75 
 
While the district court agreed that these interests were important, 
it countered that the statute could only regulate violent speech when 
the State demonstrates that the anticipated “harms are real, not merely 
conjectural.”76 Thus, the State had to prove that the video games it 
sought to regulate actually caused the listed harms.77 
Under Brandenburg, states must do more than assert that violent 
video games increase the likelihood that children will commit acts of 
violence at some undetermined time.78 Rather, the State may only 
restrict the sale of violent video games to minors if the games are 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and [are] 
likely to incite or produce such action.”79 
The district court held the VVGL failed the Brandenburg test 
because the State offered no evidence that the purpose of violent video 
games is to incite violence, and because the expert testimony and 
evidence offered at trial did not provide a causal link between playing 
                                                 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)). 
77 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. 
78 Id. at 1073. 
79 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
11
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the games and minors committing acts of violence.80 For these 
reasons, the district court found the VVGL did not promote a 
compelling government interest.81 
Additionally, the interests of preventing developmental harm to 
minors and assisting parents in shielding children from inappropriate 
material also failed as compelling interests.82 Specifically, the interest 
of preventing developmental harm failed because controlling access to 
“allegedly dangerous” speech is the responsibility of parents, not the 
State.83 Further, the interest of assisting parents in this responsibility is 
under-inclusive as applied in the VVGL because it did not assist 
parents with other media, such as TV and movies.84 
The court also dismissed the State’s argument that Ginsberg 
should apply in this matter, which would allow it to regulate content 
that is inappropriate for minors.85 The court rejected the State’s 
argument because it failed to account for the fact that the statute at 
issue in Ginsberg did not regulate protected speech—it regulated 
obscenity, which is unprotected.86 
In addition to failing the compelling interest prong of strict 
scrutiny, the district court also determined that even if the statute had 
encompassed a compelling interest, it would have failed strict scrutiny 
on narrow tailoring grounds.87 The court agreed that the statute did not 
intrude on the rights of adults, but the court still concluded that the 
plan was not narrowly tailored because the statute’s definition of 
violence would likely lead video game developers to diminish the 
amount of violence in the games to avoid regulation.88 This, in turn, 
                                                 
80 ESA I, 404 F. Supp 2d at 1073-74. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1074-75. 
83 Id. at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1075-76. 
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would affect the rights of adults by reducing the number of violent 
titles available to them.89 
The court also found that the VVGL’s definition of violent video 
games was unconstitutionally vague.90 The statute defined violent 
video games as those “including depictions of or simulations of 
human-on-human violence in which the player kills or otherwise 
causes serious physical harm to another human.”91 While the court 
would have normally found this definition sufficiently clear, it found it 
unclear in the “fanciful” context of video games because of the blurry 
line in the video game world among humans, zombies, and mutants.92 
This was not the first time a federal court in the Seventh Circuit 
examined a statute regulating violent video games for minors.93 As the 
district court noted, ESA I was governed by American Amusement 
Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick (“AAMA”).94 In AAMA, the Seventh Circuit 
analyzed the constitutionality of an ordinance that limited minors’ 
access to violent video game machines located in public places.95  
 
2. SEVGL did not include a narrowly tailored plan. 
 
Just as it did with the VVGL, the district court held the SEVGL 
was unconstitutional because it did not satisfy strict scrutiny.96 But 
unlike with the VVGL, the court struck down the statute on narrow 
tailoring grounds, not because it lacked a compelling interest.97 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1077. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 1072 (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick 
(“AAMA”), 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
94 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. 
95 AAMA, 244 F.3d 572. 
96 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. 
97 See id. 
13
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In applying strict scrutiny, the court assumed the statute satisfied 
the compelling interest requirement without offering any analysis.98 
But it found the statute failed on narrow tailoring grounds.99 The court 
premised this conclusion on the statute’s failure to include certain 
elements of Ginsberg/Miller test for obscenity.100 Namely, the statute 
failed to include the “as a whole” language of the second prong of the 
Ginsberg/Miller test and excluded the third prong entirely.101 By 
omitting the last prong of the Ginsberg/Miller test, the statute would 
necessarily regulate “large amounts of nonpornographic material with 
serious education or other value.”102 Without the final prong, the 
statute would regulate games based “on one scene without regard to 
the value of the game as a whole.”103 Such a broad statute cannot be 
justified even by the compelling interest of protecting harm to 
minors.104 
 
B. ESA II: The Seventh Circuit affirms the district court’s ruling. 
 
In ESA I, the district court struck down both the VVGL and 
SEVGL on First Amendment grounds.105 The State of Illinois then 
appealed the district court’s decision regarding the SEVGL only.106 
Judge Williams, writing for the Seventh Circuit and joined by Judge 
Bauer and Judge Rovner, affirmed the district court’s ruling primarily 
because she found the SEVGL insufficiently narrowly tailored.107  
                                                 
98 Id at 1079. 
99 Id. at 1080. 
100 Id. at 1080. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
103 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. 
104 See id. 
105 Id. at 1076, 1081. 
106 ESA II, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006). 
107 Id. 
14
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The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the SEVGL 
was a content-based restriction and thus demanded strict scrutiny 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.108 
The court held the State’s asserted interest—“shielding children 
from indecent sexual material and in assisting parents in protecting 
their children from that material”109—was most surely a compelling 
interest.110  
It then moved on to narrow tailoring and referred back to AAMA, 
in which the court held that legislation shall not unduly burden the 
First Amendment rights of minors.111 Moreover, it is not enough that a 
statute not affect the First Amendment rights of minors.112 Rather, the 
State must choose the least restrictive means available to regulate 
indecent material for minors.113 Whether a statute employs the least 
restrictive means possible is determined by applying either Ginsberg 
or Miller.114 
Because the SEVGL’s definition of “sexually explicit” did not 
conform to the full three-part test from either Ginsberg or Miller, “the 
State failed to narrowly tailor the statute and created a statute that is 
unconstitutionally overbroad.”115 The SEVGL did not include the third 
                                                 
108 Id. at 646. 
109 ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Br. of 
Pet’r-Appellant Governor Rod Blagojevich at 16, ESA II, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir 
2006) (No. 06-1012), 2006 WL 652392).  
110 ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 
(2004) (“To be sure, our cases have recognized a compelling interest in protecting 
minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials”). 
111 ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646 (quoting AAMA, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(“Children have First Amendment Rights”) (emphasis in original). 
112 ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 648-49 (“That is to say, somewhere between Ginsberg and Miller we 
arrive at the basement for constitutionality of a statute criminalizing the distribution 
of sexually oriented materials to minors”). 
115 Id. at 649. 
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prong of either Ginsberg or Miller, and also omitted the language 
requiring the regulated works to be evaluated as a whole.116 
And because the SEVGL did not require the State to evaluate each 
video game as a whole or consider the literary, educational, or artistic 
value the games may have provided, the statute needlessly 
encompassed video games that have “social importance for minors.”117 
The game God of War, is one example of a game that the SEVGL 
would regulate because it renders images of exposed female breasts.118 
But taken as whole, the game provides some social importance for 
minors, and should escape regulation.119 
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REEVALUATE  
ROTH AND MILLER/GINSBERG 
 
A. The Supreme Court should reevaluate Roth  
and hold that the First Amendment protects obscenity. 
 
The Court’s refusal to afford First Amendment protection to 
obscenity is unsupported by precedent, policy, and logic. To 
understand why, we must first look to Roth v. U.S., in which the 
Supreme Court firmly established that obscenity is not protected 
speech.120 
The general thrust of Roth is two-fold: 1) obscenity does not 
contribute meaningfully to society, and is thus not deserving of 
protection;121 and 2) it is implicit that the First Amendment does not 
protect obscenity.122  
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 649-50. 
118 Id. at 650 (discussing the game God of War, which is similar in content and 
theme to Homer’s Odyssey). 
119 Id. at 650. 
120 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 
121 See id. at 484. 
122 See id. at 483. 
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But the Court never fully establishes why and how obscene 
speech does not contribute to society. And the idea that “implicit in the 
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity” is 
illogical and ultimately unsupportable.123 Although the Court cited 
dozens of cases to support this proposition, one need look no further 
than the first case cited to determine that the support is strained, at 
best.  
The Court first cited to Ex Parte Jackson, a case from 1877 
concerning a statute regulating use of the mails.124 In Jackson, the 
Court found it was without question that the mails could not be used to 
send “obscene, lewd, or lascivious” materials.125 But using this 
passage to support the proposition that obscenity was never meant to 
be protected by the First Amendment strains reason. Consider that in 
the very same passage, the Court also held that states could prevent the 
use of the mail system to send materials regarding birth control, 
abortion, indecency, and lotteries.126  
Because Jackson proscribed use of the mails for many purposes 
now allowed, logic cannot sustain the inference that Jackson supports 
an entire category of speech being exempted from First Amendment 
protection. While Jackson is merely one case of many cited by the 
Court in Roth, it illustrates the utter lack of logic underlying its 
holding. The Court attempts to rely on precedent to support its 
holding, but no clear precedent exists.127  
Furthermore, while it may have once been assumed that obscenity 
was not intended for First Amendment protection, this alone should 
not suffice to support the excising of an entire category of speech from 
                                                 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 481 (citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877)). 
125 96 U.S. at 736. 
126 Id. 
127 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 (noting that Roth presented a question of first 
impression). 
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First Amendment protection.128 Many ideas and policies once accepted 
have long since been rejected.129 
In an attempt to address just what it is about obscenity that 
distinguishes it from other objectionable forms of expression, the 
Court endorsed the Model Penal Code’s definition of obscenity: “A 
thing is obscene if . . . it goes substantially beyond customary limits of 
candor in description or representation of [nudity, sex, or 
excretion].”130 But this definition contradicts the Court’s own 
reasoning with language within the same opinion. The Court took 
great care in Roth to note that “unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, 
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full 
protection of the [First Amendment].”131 This explanation of the First 
Amendment certainly seems to encompass that which “goes 
substantially beyond customary limits of candor.”132 Yet, the Court 
refuses to conform to its own logic. This internal contradiction and 
inconsistency exemplifies the overarching contradictory nature of 
obscenity jurisprudence. 
The Roth Court also went to great lengths to avoid expressly 
answering the question of why obscenity is judged on the basis of 
offensiveness and not its likelihood of inciting lawless action.133 And it 
did so by offering a stunningly circular argument: obscenity is judged 
on the basis of offensiveness rather than any harm it may cause 
because it is not protected speech, and it is not protected because it is 
not judged on the harm it may cause.134 Not only is this argument 
                                                 
128 See id. at 484. 
129 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1; 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
130 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 n. 20 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) 
(Tentative Draft No. 6 1957)). 
131 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
132 Id. at 488. 
133 Id. at 486-87. 
134 Id. (quoting Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 266 
(1952)) (“Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be 
punished only upon a showing of [harm it causes]”)). 
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circular, but it contradicts the Court’s own reasoning in other First 
Amendment cases.135  
There exists an even greater problem with the Roth decision, as 
noted by Justice Douglas.136 The Court’s decision allows states to 
punish for “thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor antisocial 
conduct.”137 This position allows states to regulate materials merely 
for the thoughts they provoke rather than harms they cause, a position 
otherwise rejected by the Supreme Court.138 The standard authorized 
in Roth conflicts with the First Amendment, and “[c]ertainly that 
standard would not be an acceptable one if religion, economics, 
polities or philosophy were involved. How does it become a 
constitutional standard when literature treating with sex is 
concerned?”139 
The Court has not yet answered this question and neither has the 
Seventh Circuit. In light of this, it makes little sense to apply a 
different standard to obscenity than to violent expression. The Court 
should remedy this by answering Justice Douglas’ question or 
providing First Amendment protection to obscenity. 
 
B. States’ compelling interest in preventing harm to minors should 
apply equally to violent and sexual content. 
 
The district court and the Seventh Circuit correctly applied 
Supreme Court precedent in ESA I and ESA II, respectively. The law is 
clear regarding sexually explicit materials: shielding minors from 
                                                 
135 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (stating “the 
fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing 
it”). 
136 Roth, 354 U.S. at 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“It is no answer to 
say, as the Court does, that obscenity is not protected speech”). 
137 Id. at 509. 
138 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s 
First Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between 
ideas and conduct”). 
139 Roth, 354 U.S. at 512 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
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sexually explicit content is a compelling interest.140 The law is equally 
clear regarding violent content: states may not regulate violent 
expression absent a showing that the speech is directed at causing 
imminent violence and is likely to do so.141 
Less clear is the reason why it is compelling to protect children 
from sexually explicit materials, but not violent materials. This is 
especially true given the overarching compelling interest of 
“protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.”142 
Judge Posner attempted to explain this distinction in AAMA in 2000, 
but his explanation falls short.143 
As Judge Posner explained, the concerns animating obscenity 
laws and violent expressions are very different.144 Obscenity is not 
denied constitutional protection because of the harm it causes, but 
rather simply because it is offensive.145 Unlike with nearly all other 
categories of expression, states need not demonstrate that obscenity is 
likely to incite lawlessness or cause harm in order to regulate it.146 
With obscenity, “[o]ffensiveness is the offense.”147 
But as Judge Posner pointed out, a statute regulating violent 
expression based on offensiveness could not withstand judicial 
scrutiny.148 Protecting citizens from violence is a compelling interest, 
but unlike obscenity law, protecting them from violent images is 
not.149 
Judge Posner dispensed with this seemingly arbitrary distinction 
between sex and violence by asserting that protecting people from 
violent images is a novel idea, while protecting people from sexually 
                                                 
140 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004). 
141 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
142 Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
143 See generally 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2000). 
144 Id. at 574. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 575. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942)). 
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explicit images is the traditional concern of obscenity laws.150 This is 
true, but it does not explain why this distinction exists; it merely 
explains that it does exist. 
The central holding of Ginsberg is that potential psychological 
harm to minors is a sufficient basis for shielding children from sexual 
expression.151 The Court remarked that this finding was not “an 
accepted scientific fact.”152 But the Court held that it did not require 
scientific proof; it was enough for the Court that it merely not be 
irrational to conclude that sexual materials may harm children.153  
Judge Posner referenced this basis in AAMA when he suggested 
that an ordinance regulating violent video games premised on harm to 
children must meet the same standard from Ginsberg.154 If this were 
true, then a mere showing of potential harm from exposing juveniles to 
violent images would suffice to regulate violent content. But he then 
contradicted himself and completely misstated Ginsberg by stating 
that “[t]he grounds must be compelling not merely plausible.”155  
This internal inconsistency from AAMA is representative of the 
logic, or lack thereof, regarding whether harm to minors is a 
compelling interest. 
In Ginsberg, the Court found no causal link between sexually 
explicit materials and harm to children, but did not require such a link 
to find the statute constitutional.156 The Court even stated, “[w]e do 
not demand of legislatures scientifically certain criteria of 
legislation.”157 But both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit 
demand this scientific rigor when it comes to statutes regulating 
                                                 
150 AAMA, 244 F.3d. at 575-76. 
151 Id. at 576. 
152 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968). 
153 Id. 
154 AAMA, 244 F.3d at 576. 
155 Id. 
156 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642. 
157 Id. at 642-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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violent images.158 In fact, this lack of a scientific causal connection 
between violent video games and increased aggression in minors who 
play such games was central to the district court striking down the 
VVGL in ESA I.159 
As a matter of legal consistency, the courts should apply the same 
level of scrutiny to all expression aimed at minors. If it is so clearly a 
compelling interest to protect the psychological and physical welfare 
of minors,160 then the specific category of expression should not 
matter. If the potential harm to children stemming from exposure to 
sexually explicit images is enough to regulate sexual expression aimed 
at juveniles, then the potential harm to children stemming from 
exposure to violent images should also be enough to regulate violent 
expression aimed at juveniles.  
The Seventh Circuit’s response to this idea has been that concern 
over sexual images has long been a concern of the people, but not so 
for violent images.161 But as Justice Harlan highlighted, the fact that 
obscenity is not protected speech does not answer the question why it 
is not protected.162 
Additionally, much of the logic Judge Posner uses to justify 
exposing minors to violent images works applies equally well to 
sexual images.163 Judge Posner argued quite sensibly that violence is 
often a matter of politics, and young voters should be allowed access 
to uncensored speech prior to becoming voting age “so that their 
minds are not a blank when they first exercise the franchise.”164 
“People are unlikely to become well-functioning, independent-minded 
adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an intellectual 
                                                 
158 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); AAMA, 244 F.3d at 
579. 
159 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d, 1051, 1073-74 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
160 Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
161 AAMA, 244 F.3d 572, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2001). 
162 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 507 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
163 AAMA, 244 F.3d at 577-78. 
164 Id. at 577. 
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bubble.”165 This argument works just as well if the topic becomes 
sexually explicit materials, rather than violent materials.  
Judge Posner continued to argue against regulating violent images 
aimed at children because violence is a significant human interest.166 
This is no doubt true, but it is no less true of sex, and the Supreme 
Court admitted as much even when holding that the First Amendment 
does not protect obscenity.167 If humankind’s interest in violence is 
equaled by its interest in sex, and violent expression is afforded 
protection on the basis of human interest, then obscenity should also 
be afforded that protection. 
Finally, Judge Posner argued that “shield[ing] children right up to 
the age of 18 from exposure to violent descriptions and images would 
not only be quixotic, but deforming; it would leave them unequipped 
to cope with the world as we know it.”168 Again, because sex is a 
recurrent interest of humankind, this statement can apply with equal 
force to sexual expression. Young adults face great exposure to sexual 
content, and to shield minors from access to this material is no less 
quixotic. 
Ultimately, the district court and the Seventh Circuit correctly 
struck down both the VVGL and SEVGL, but the SEVGL was given a 
free pass on the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny whereas 
the VVGL was found not to encompass a compelling interest. This 
disparity is troubling from a policy and parental perspective, but also 
inconsistent legally. 
The logical conclusion is not necessarily that sexual expression 
should be afforded the same high level of scrutiny as violent 
expression in the context of minors, but rather that the interest in 
protecting minors from violent expression should equal that of sexual 
expression. 
                                                 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (“Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human 
life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the 
ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern”). 
168 AAMA, 244 F.3d at 577. 
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Nearly all forms of expression demand full First Amendment 
protection, yet obscenity continues to fall outside the cover of this 
protective shield.  
Currently, states may regulate obscenity merely for thoughts 
provoked and not for harms it may cause. But as the Court has noted, 
“First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government 
seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible 
end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must 
be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of 
thought.”169 
In order to uphold the virtues and purpose of the First 
Amendment, the Court should change course and afford obscenity the 
full protection of the First Amendment, just as it does other categories 
of objectionable and offensive speech. 
This is not the only change the Court should make in First 
Amendment law. The Court justifiably holds that protecting children 
from sexually indecent materials is a compelling interest strong 
enough to withstand strict scrutiny because of potential psychological 
harm such materials may cause children.170 And it allows regulations 
on this basis absent a causal link between the sexually explicit 
materials and such harm.  
But courts are not able to apply this same standard to violent 
materials aimed at minors. Instead, when it comes to violent materials, 
legislatures must demonstrate a causal link between the violent content 
and imminent violent conduct.171  
This disparity between sexual and violent content makes little 
sense in light of the compelling interest of protecting the psychological 
welfare of minors.172 So if sexual materials directed to minors may be 
                                                 
169 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
170 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004). 
171 ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
172 Sable Comm’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
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